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Abstract
Exploring the entire set of formal and informal payments available to health workers (HWs) is
critical to understand the financial incentives they face and devise effective incentive packages to
motivate them. We investigate this issue in the context of Sierra Leone by collecting quantitative
data through a survey and daily logbooks on the incomes of 266 HWs in three districts, and carry-
ing out 39 qualitative in-depth interviews. We find that, while earnings related to the HWs official
jobs represent the largest share, their income is fragmented and composed of a variety of pay-
ments, and there is a large heterogeneity in the importance of each income source within the total
remuneration. Importantly, each income has different features in terms of regularity, reliability,
ease of access, etc. Our analysis also reveals the determinants of the incomes received and their
level based on individual and facility characteristics, and finds that these are not in line with HRH
policies defined at national level. Additionally, from their narratives, it emerges that HWs are ‘man-
aging’, in the sense both of ‘getting by’ and of enacting financial coping strategies, such as mental
accounting (spending different incomes differently), income hiding to shelter it from family pres-
sures, and re-investment of incomes to stabilize overall earnings over time, in order to ensure their
livelihoods and those of their families. These strategies question the assumption of fungibility of in-
comes and the neutrality of increasing or regulating one rather than another of them. Together, our
findings on earning and income use patterns have important policy implications for how we go
about (re)thinking financial incentive strategies.
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Key messages
• This study describes the incomes of primary health workers in Sierra Leone and finds that salaries make up about 60%
of the total revenues, while the rest is composed by a variety of formal and informal incomes.
• Health workers’ narratives reveal that the satisfaction related to the incomes does not depends only on their amounts,
but also on non-financial features. Based on these features, health workers choose to assign incomes to different uses.
• These findings have policy implications for designing incentives as they call for more attention to the earning opportuni-
ties for health workers beyond formal allowances, and to the HWs own perspectives which question the assumption of
income fungibility.
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increased attention to the deter-
minants of health workers’ (HWs) motivation, and in particular the
role of financial incentives (Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). Some coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa have embarked on reforms to increase
salary levels (Mueller et al. 2011), while new incentives such as per-
formance-based financing are increasingly introduced (Witter et al.
2012). In some settings, remunerations from external sources, such
as salary supplementations (‘top-ups’) and per diems from aid agen-
cies, are thought to account for an important part of HWs’ income
(Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe 2000; Vian et al. 2013). Moreover,
given the weak regulatory capacity of governments and the presence
of informal healthcare markets in many low-income settings (Ensor
and Witter 2001), HWs often engage in various other activities,
including private practice, non-health activities such as trading or
agriculture, informal fees requests and illegal sale of drugs (Roenen
et al. 1997; Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe 2000). The existence of
multiple sources of income, that we termed ‘complex remuneration’,
creates a multifaceted set of incentives which may affect the motiv-
ation and performance of HWs in several ways (Bertone and Witter
2015a).
A comprehensive approach to the study of financial incentives is
essential to describe the income of HWs and the relative and abso-
lute level of each of the income components, beyond those received
for their official job. However, with some exceptions (McCoy et al.
2008), few studies look at the entire set of earnings, and little is
known about the individual and facility characteristics associated
with the fragmented income structure and with the variability in in-
come levels, or about the implications of such fragmentation in
terms of HWs’ views and relative satisfaction with the different
components of their income. From a policy perspective, taking into
account the full set of incomes of HWs is essential in order to design
effective incentive packages. These issues are particularly critical,
and even less studied, in post-conflict settings where the fragmenta-
tion of the health system and the presence of many, often uncoordin-
ated, actors at local level may determine the multiplication of
payment sources.
In this paper, we look at the case of healthcare providers work-
ing in public primary care facilities in three districts in Sierra Leone.
Using a quantitative survey, the study aims firstly at describing the
level of each source of income, and their relative importance. We
then model the determinants of the incomes received to explore
which factors, at individual and facility level, affect them. Finally,
we explore the HWs’ perceptions about each of the revenues, and
how incomes are relevant to them, beyond the amount. By exploring
the HWs’ narratives on income use, we also investigate their finan-
cial coping strategies and the role that the different incomes play in
those.
Context
After a decade of armed conflict and social and economic unrest,
Sierra Leone has been rebuilding its health system since 2002. In
order to increase the demand for health services and improve health
outcomes, user fees for maternal and child health services were
removed in April 2010 (Donnelly 2011). Given the low number of
HWs (in 2011, there were an estimated 0.071 doctors and 0.631
nurses per 1000 people in the public sector) and their uneven distri-
bution (Witter et al. 2016), with the launch of the Free Healthcare
Initiative (FHCI), a series of reforms were designed and imple-
mented to address the issues of distribution, retention and
motivation of the health workforce (Bertone et al. 2014). These re-
forms included the cleaning of the Ministry of Health (MoH) payroll
to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ and add those working without salary,
a salary increase and a one-off fast-track recruitment and deploy-
ment process to increase workers in rural areas. In 2011, a perform-
ance-based financing (PBF) scheme was launched which includes
bonuses for individual staff based on facility performance, and in
2012 a remote allowance for those working in rural posts was intro-
duced. In parallel, donors and most NGOs adopted measures to en-
sure the alignment and rationalization of the HWs’ incentive
package, in particular, by abolishing salary top-ups linked to vertical
programs and disease-specific activities (e.g. HIV/AIDS services).
However, these reforms have only been partially implemented
and many challenges remain (Witter et al. 2016). Since the technical
assistance to the Payroll Unit ended, the MoH payroll is increasingly
imprecise. An external verification of the PBF scheme, carried out in
April 2014, reported delays of more than one year in the payment of
PBF bonuses (Cordaid 2014). As for the remote allowance, pay-
ments stopped by the end of 2012 because of cash-flow issues
(Bertone et al. 2014). Moreover, the implementation of policies
relies on NGOs at district level, whose presence varies considerably
for geographical coverage and service/disease focus. Among the
three districts where the research was carried out (Bo, Kenema and
Moyamba, all in the southern part of Sierra Leone), Moyamba is the
most rural and poor district. Two main NGOs, focused on nutrition
services only, worked there. In Bo, a wealthier and more urban dis-
trict, several NGOs divided up their activities based on a geograph-
ical repartition but not all facilities were supported, and in Kenema
few NGOs operated, with the leading one covering all facilities and
providing support on a broad range of maternal and child health
services (Bertone and Witter 2015b). Additionally, since May 2014,
Sierra Leone has been afflicted by an unprecedented Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) outbreak. The epidemic started weeks after the con-
clusion of fieldwork for this research so that this paper reflects the
situation as it was before the epidemic. However, there is emerging
evidence that the EVD outbreak may have emphasized the fragmen-
tation of HWs’ remuneration.
Methods
Study design
This is a mixed-methods study carried out in three districts in Sierra
Leone, which were purposefully chosen to allow for variation in
number of NGOs, as well as level of poverty, urbanization and type
of facilities—that we hypothesized to have an impact on the remu-
nerations of HWs. In the districts, primary quantitative and qualita-
tive data were collected at individual HW level. Ethical clearance
was obtained from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review
Committee.
Quantitative data
Quantitative data were collected between September and December
2013 by a team of ten trained enumerators. A random sample of
198 primary health facilities were chosen, out of the 346 in the three
districts. The sample was constructed to include the same number of
facilities in each district (n¼66) and to include all types of primary
healthcare facility, i.e. Community Health Centers (CHC),
Community Health Posts (CHP) and Maternal and Child Health
Posts (MCHP). Within each facility, enumerators selected 1 or 2
workers (for MCHPs and CHCs/CHPs respectively) who were
Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 8 1011
clinically qualified and available on the day of the survey. ‘In-
charges’ (i.e. managers of facilities) were interviewed before other
qualified cadres. A total of 266 HWs were interviewed, encompass-
ing two cadres of non-physician clinicians: Community Health
Officers (CHOs) and Community Health Assistants (CHAs); two
cadres of nurses and midwives; and a cadre of nursing aides
(Maternal and Child Health Aides—MCH Aides). For the purpose
of the analysis, CHAs and nurses/midwives are grouped together as
they have similar grades in the MoH designation plan.
HWs were administered a face-to-face survey that included
open-ended questions on the amount received monthly for the fol-
lowing sources of income: salary, remote allowance, individual PBF
bonus, share of the user fees charged for non-exempted services,
top-ups or salary supplementations, per diems and income-generat-
ing activities outside of the health sector. The questionnaire also
included questions on demographic information (sex, age, marital
status, cadre, education, role within facility, i.e. in-charge or staff)
and facility characteristics (type of facility, remoteness level, dis-
trict). In addition, at the end of the interview, HWs were given log-
books to fill daily for a prospective period of eight weeks. In their
logbooks, HWs had to report their activities, as well as revenues
earned each day. Each HW was visited by the same enumerator
three times over the 8 weeks, and received regular calls and text re-
minders. We believe that this prolonged relation and the consequent
increased trust may have led a higher level of disclosure of informal
incomes in the logbooks (Corti 1993). Therefore, to estimate the
total income, we added, to the incomes estimated in the survey, data
from the logbooks for revenues from illegal sale of drugs, gifts and
payments from patients and private practice.
Qualitative data
We conducted two rounds of in-depth interviews in November–
December 2013 and March-April 2014, with a sub-sample of 39
HWs purposefully selected among the 266 above. HWs were chosen
to reflect a wide variety of views and situations in terms of cadre,
but also rural/urban, male/female, type of facility, in-charge/staff
and district and to be in line with the mix of health workers in the
districts (Table 1). The semi-structured interview guide was itera-
tively adapted during the rounds of interviews, and interviews were
carried out until saturation was reached. The main issues of focus
were (1) income sources, and views on level and fairness and (2)
strategies for the maximization, stabilization and use of income(s),
including at individual, household and facility level.
Quantitative data analysis
Income data were converted to monthly equivalents and used to
construct the total income of HWs. We calculated the average
monthly amount for each income and its importance relative to total
income. Then, we estimate two types of multivariate regressions.
The first estimates a logistic regression to explore the determinants
of the likelihood of receiving each type of income (the dependent
variable is equal to 1 if the HW declared to have received some rev-
enue from that particular source in the past month). In the second
model, we run a linear regression model to estimate the determin-
ants of the level of each type of income, and total income received
(the dependent variables are log-transformed income amounts). For
both models, we explore the influence of individual (i.e. gender, age,
cadre/qualification, role within facility), as well as facility character-
istics (i.e. type of facility, urban/rural, district).
Qualitative data analysis
Qualitative interviews were recorded, transcribed and manually
analysed using content framework analysis (Ritchie and Lewis
2003). Qualitative data were explored in complementarity to quan-
titative data, in a deductive and inductive way, i.e. both to confirm
and further explore issues emerging from quantitative analysis (such
as, HWs’ views and perceptions).
Results
Health workers’ remuneration: income components and
fragmentation
The characteristics of the sample of HWs surveyed are summarized
in Table 2. Overall, results show that the monthly income of pri-
mary HWs are 164 USD for MCH Aides, 235 USD for CHAs/nurses
and 314 USD for CHOs (Figure 1). They also point to the fact that
HWs’ remuneration is complex and fragmented, with revenue from
official job activities (salary, remote allowance, user fees and PBF)
contributing to 71% of total income for CHOs, 66% for CHAs/
nurses and 76% for MCH Aides. Governmental salary is the major
source of income for public primary healthcare workers, although it
represents only slightly more than half of their total income. The se-
cond major source of income are the per diems paid by the MoH or
external organizations for activities such as attending trainings, tak-
ing part in or supervising immunization campaigns. Per diems make
up between 15% and 21% of total income depending on the HW
cadre. The next most importance source of revenue is PBF bonuses
received, providing about 10% of the total income for all cadres,
while top-ups seem to represent very limited additional revenue for
HWs. Because of the exemptions under the FHCI, user fees also rep-
resent a small share of HW revenue (1–3% of total income), with
only 27% of HWs declaring to have received revenue from user fees.
Similarly, revenues from under-the-counter sale of drugs and other
items and private practice represent a negligible proportion of HW
income (all <1%). In contrast, although incomes declared as ‘gifts
and payments from patients’ may be underestimating the under-the-
table payments for health services still illegally charged to patients
(as partially documented in Denney and Mallett 2014), the fact that
74% of workers declared to be receiving them and their estimate at
3–5% of total revenues seems to be reliable with reference to an-
other aspect of the relation between HWs and patients/communities.
Indeed, it emerged from the interviews that under this category
Table 1. Characteristics of respondent sample for qualitative data
collection
CHO
(n ¼ 4)
CHA þ Nurse
(n ¼ 10)
MCH Aide
(n ¼ 25)
Total
(n ¼ 39)
Gender
Male 4 3 – 11
Female – 7 25 28
Age (mean) 32.5 47 40.4 41.3
Type of facility
CHC 4 5 4 13
CHP – 4 3 7
MCHP – 1 18 19
Location
Urban 3 6 4 13
Rural 1 4 21 26
District
Bo 3 1 8 12
Kenema – 4 9 13
Moyamba 1 5 8 14
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HWs report gifts usually in-kind (rice, palm oil, cassava, yam, char-
coal, chicken, etc.) that patients and communities provide them
with. Finally, income through activities outside of the health sector
(most frequently: farming, small trading and businesses including
buying palm oil to resell when prices are higher, or credit groups)
represents 2–7% of the income. However, for the 21% of HWs re-
porting such earnings, they represent a substantial revenue, amount-
ing to 20, 23 and 11% of the total income for CHOs, CHAs/nurse
and MCH Aides respectively.
The determinants of remuneration
Beyond the issue of income fragmentation, the analysis of survey
data reveals that there is much heterogeneity in total income as well
as in the revenue breakdown. To explore whether or not differences
are linked to justifiable and observed individual characteristics (e.g.
higher cadres or older HWs earning more) or to HRH policies (e.g.
allowances to HWs in rural areas), we estimated a multivariate re-
gression model of the different income levels. Table 3 presents the
results of the analysis exploring factors associated with earnings
from the main sources of revenue. We find that the odds of earning
income from selling drugs are almost 20 times larger for CHOs com-
pared to CHAs/nurses and MCH Aides (col.6). The odds of receiv-
ing a salary are 11 times larger (col.1) for in-charges (i.e. the facility
managers) compared to staff workers. Their odds of receiving PBF
bonus almost 4 times larger (col.2) and odds of receiving gifts from
patients 3 times higher (col.7). Being young decreases the likelihood
of receiving a salary (OR: 0.206, col.1) but increases the likelihood
of taking up income generating activities outside of the health sector
(OR: 2.014, col.5). Looking at facility characteristics, those working
in CHPs are more likely to receive a salary (OR: 5.702, col.1) and a
Table 2. Characteristics of respondent sample for quantitative data collection
CHO
(n ¼ 30)
CHAþNurse
(n ¼ 76)
MCH Aide
(n ¼ 160)
Total
(n ¼ 266)
Statistical Significance
of difference in
proportions/means
Test used
Gender
Male 73% 42% – 20% p < 0.0001 Chi2
Female 27% 58% 100% 80%
Age (mean) 41.4 40.8 40.9 41 p ¼ 0.946 Bonferroni
Role in facility p < 0.0001 Chi2
In-charge 90% 67% 49% 59%
Staff 10% 33% 51% 41%
Type of facility
CHC 97% 51% 16% 35% p < 0.0001 Chi2
CHP – 42% 29% 30%
MCHP 3% 7% 55% 35%
Location
Urban 30% 32% 21% 25% p ¼ 0.106 Chi2
Rural 70% 68% 79% 75%
District
Bo 60% 30% 34% 36% p ¼ 0.020 Chi2
Kenema 20% 44% 32% 34%
Moyamba 20% 26% 34% 30%
Figure 1. Absolute and relative mean income by cadre and by component. Note: Exchange rate: 1 USD ¼ 4270 Leones (October 2013)
Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 8 1013
PBF bonus (OR: 2.509, col.2) than those in MCHPs, but both those
working in CHCs and CHPs are less likely to receive a share of user
fees (OR respectively: 0.284 and 0.296, col.3). HWs working in
urban areas are less likely to receive per diems from external organ-
izations (OR: 0.316, col.4) or gifts from patients (OR: 0.467, col.7),
compared to those working in rural areas. In-depth interviews sug-
gested that this is because most of the gifts received in these rural,
farming areas are in-kind, since this is what patients and commun-
ities have easier access to.
Table 4 reports factors associated with receiving a higher income
for certain sources. As expected, we find that HWs of higher cadres
receive significantly higher salary compared to MCH Aides (col.2).
CHOs also have a higher income from user fees (col.4). Facility in-
charges are shown to earn higher PBF bonuses, and significantly
higher overall income compared to workers in staff positions (col.1).
Workers in higher level facility receive a lower income from gifts
from patients (col.7), but overall have a higher income (significantly
for those in CHCs) (col.1). There is also some heterogeneity across
districts, as workers in Bo receive less PBF payments and per diems
(col.3,5) than those in the other districts, while in Kenema PBF pay-
ments received are higher (col.5). This results in a significantly
higher overall income for HWs in Kenema (col.1).
Health workers’ satisfaction with their incomes
HWs interviewed overall agreed that their salary was the most im-
portant and dependable source of income. However, the majority
expressed dissatisfaction with their salary level stating that is was
‘not enough’ (mentioned by eight HWs), ‘small for the job’ (five
HWs), or ‘not satisfying’ (one HW). The only HWs who had rela-
tively positive views were those already employed before the FCHI,
as they were comparing their current salary level to that before.
While salary payments were reported to be made on time and regu-
larly, HWs mentioned that salaries can only be accessed through the
local branch of banks located in the main towns, far from the rural
facilities where they work. Moreover, because of the issue with the
payroll, all interviewed HWs who (re)trained after 2010 mentioned
they did not receive their salary or received the payment correspond-
ing to their old cadre.
In contrast, HWs’ narratives were overwhelmingly positive when
discussing performance-based payments. PBF was said to ‘help’
(three HWs), to be ‘good money’ (two HWs), or ‘really enough’
(one HW). While these comments were in stark contrast with the
views on salary and at odds with PBF relatively limited contribution
to the overall income, positive remarks have to be understood in the
context of the entire set of payments, and their features. The rather
unpredictable timing and the yearly delays of the PBF payments
(which delink it from the activities performed and the effort exerted
at the time) make the bonuses seen as a gift, with less sense of en-
titlement compared to the salary. It also emerged that PBF was per-
ceived as a complement to the salary. HWs admitted that:
I am happy with it because my salary is so small so if I am getting
that [PBF], I am happy with the government (MCH Aide in Kenema)
Table 3. Odds of receiving revenues from a particular source (logistic regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Received
Salary
Received
PBF
Received
user fees
Received
per diems
Received income
from non-health
activities
Received income
from sale of drugs
Received gifts
HW characteristics
Cadre (omitted category: MCH Aide)
CHO n/a 0.413 2.441 0.332 0.276 19.081 *** 0.985
(0.290) (1.793) (0.263) (0.238) (19.033) (0.750)
CHAþnurse 0.913 0.348 ** 1.966 1.125 0.520 2.128 1.350
(0.783) (0.154) (0.966) (0.535) (0.289) (1.358) (0.683)
In-charge (omitted category: staff) 11.348 *** 3.825 *** 0.878 1.852 2.526 1.384 2.731 **
(7.627) (1.476) (0.354) (0.757) (1.226) (0.751) (1.139)
Male (omitted category: female) 0.370 1.578 1.801 2.804 2.060 0.221 ** 0.296 **
(0.353) (0.721) (0.829) (1.641) (1.066) (0.157) (0.156)
Aged <35 0.206 *** 0.711 1.694 0.982 2.014 ** 1.529 1.247
(0.103) (0.218) (0.561) (0.338) (0.710) (0.702) (0.434)
Facility characteristics
Urban (omitted category: rural) 3.831 1.208 0.931 0.316 *** 1.575 0.819 0.467 **
(2.966) (0.432) (0.348) (0.116) (0.623) (0.427) (0.168)
Type of facility (omitted category: MCHP)
Community Health Center 3.899 2.085 0.284 ** 1.823 1.764 0.309 1.907
(3.000) (1.055) (0.162) (1.024) (1.141) (0.243) (1.044)
Community Health Post 5.702 ** 2.509 ** 0.296 *** 1.223 1.988 0.379 1.595
(3.916) (1.040) (0.137) (0.526) (1.000) (0.238) (0.716)
District (omitted category: Moyamba)
Bo 0.397 0.819 1.780 2.121 1.872 0.771 0.623
(0.248) (0.269) (0.666) (0.825) (0.780) (0.428) (0.230)
Kenema 0.770 1.969 1.664 0.950 2.028 2.227 0.906
(0.505) (0.691) (0.634) (0.341) (0.851) (1.089) (0.354)
Observations 236 266 266 266 266 266 266
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Incomes from remote allowance, top-ups, private practice not shown.
***p<0.01.
**p< 0.05.
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[PBF] helps me because if you are getting your salary, then you
have a small amount adding to that (MCHAide in Kenema).
My salary is acceptable to me with the help of PBF (MCH Aide
in Moyamba)
However, the positive views of PBF payments were mitigated by
their non-financial features, such as the irregularity, the delays in
payment and the complicated and opaque sharing practices which
were caused by those delays (Bertone 2015).
Although some HWs complained that per diems were sometimes
not sufficient to cover transport to and lodging in the place of train-
ing, most agreed that a proportion could be saved and represented a
net revenue. As suggested by the quantitative evidence, interviews
confirmed that per diems were far from being negligible, and some-
times even substantial. One HW recounted, ‘[Once] we had about
600000 Le. [140 USD] for 5 days. I was joyful!’ (CHA/nurse in
Moyamba). Others said that DSA (acronym for Daily Subsistence
Allowance, which is how per diems are referred to in Sierra Leone)
‘is a good thing’ (MCH Aide in Moyamba), ‘is important for us’
(MCH Aide in Kenema). On the other hand, per diems were seen as
unstable and unpredictable, and difficult to depend on for regular
expenditures.
Finally, most HWs viewed engaging in income-generating activ-
ities as a necessary ‘back up’ to complement their revenues. Some
HWs reported to be setting up, or planning to set up, a small busi-
ness or petty trading, once possible. When that was not possible,
many chose to engage in agriculture activities.
500,000 [Leones – MCH Aide salary] is very small, so we have
to do business! (MCH Aide in Moyamba)
I am doing petty trading to back up (CHA/nurse in Moyamba)
I have a cassava field in the backyard. To do business here is im-
possible (MCH Aide in Bo).
Overall, it emerged from the HWs accounts that financial issues
were a major concern for most, and some mentioned income frag-
mentation as a specific problem. When asked about their financial
coping strategies, HWs recurrently said that they ‘manage’:
Well, if I gather everything together at the same time it helps [i.e.
my income is enough], but the money does not come together [at
the same time], it comes in little bits. So what I have at the mo-
ment, I manage with it. I have no other way to do it (CHA/nurse
in Kenema).
I have to manage my life with it [my income] (MCH Aide in
Moyaba)
Well it is not easy. You have to manage yourself (CHA/nurse in
Moyamba)
‘To manage’ can be rightfully interpreted in the sense that they sur-
vive, they ‘get by’, but also that they actively administer and organ-
ize their different incomes and spend them differently in order to
maximize financial options, deal with income instability and ensure
their subsistence and the livelihoods of their families.
Differential utilization of incomes
In-depth interviews provided evidence of the HWs’ differential util-
ization of their revenues, revealing how they take advantage of the
features of each income to choose how and what to use them for.
The general practice seemed to use the salary (i.e. the highest and
Table 4. Determinants of amount of revenue from a particular source (linear regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total income Salary PBF User fees Per diems Sale of drugs Gifts
HW characteristics
Cadre (omitted category: MCH Aide)
CHO 0.283 0.450 *** 0.118 1.215 ** 0.500 1.664 0.331
(0.193) (0.047) (0.283) (0.596) (0.309) (1.537) (0.415)
CHAþnurse 0.116 0.161 *** 0.054 0.758 0.141 0.924 0.044
(0.123) (0.030) (0.186) (0.395) (0.198) (1.192) (0.276)
In-charge (omitted category: staff) 0.529 *** 0.003 0.332 ** 0.082 0.132 0.292 0.459
(0.105) (0.027) (0.158) (0.295) (0.171) (0.532) (0.237)
Male (omitted category: female) 0.035 0.012 0.266 0.317 0.195 0.073 0.016
(0.126) (0.030) (0.173) (0.390) (0.195) (0.661) (0.277)
Facility characteristics
Urban (omitted category: rural) 0.012 0.018 0.109 0.039 0.626 *** 0.946 0.320
(0.099) (0.024) (0.141) (0.303) (0.174) (0.563) (0.240)
Type of facility (omitted category: MCHP)
Community Health Center 0.352 ** 0.021 0.022 0.003 0.283 2.106 0.107
(0.143) (0.037) (0.214) (0.400) (0.231) (1.451) (0.324)
Community Health Post 0.166 0.003 0.126 0.064 0.054 1.701 0.590 **
(0.114) (0.029) (0.161) (0.360) (0.184) (1.052) (0.260)
District (omitted category: Moyamba)
Bo 0.034 0.027 0.656 *** 0.138 0.441 *** 1.509 ** 0.388
(0.094) (0.023) (0.136) (0.311) (0.149) (0.612) (0.211)
Kenema 0.204 ** 0.028 0.160 0.109 0.541 *** 1.614 ** 0.226
(0.095) (0.023) (0.128) (0.322) (0.159) (0.580) (0.205)
Observations 266 241 163 72 198 34 197
R-squared 0.242 0.558 0.240 0.190 0.316 0.357 0.113
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Incomes from remote allowance, top-ups, private practice and non-health income generating activities not shown.
***p<0.01.
**p< 0.05.
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most stable source of revenue) for expenditures that are large and re-
current, such as school/college fees for children and supporting the
(extended) family’s financial needs and requests:
I use it [salary] to provide for my family. Sometimes 50,000
[Leones] remains with me after having spent everything [I need
to take care of the family], so that I buy food and bring it here
for myself (CHA/nurse in Kenema)
[After collecting my salary], I will always see my family and ad-
dress problems there before (CHA/nurse in Moyama).
Even yesterday, [. . .] one of my daughters called me for a certain
amount of money. I went down to the bank and collected the
money and sent it to her in Freetown (MCH Aide in Bo).
Like, the school fees and the college fees depend on the salary.
The side [incomes], I keep them for their feeding and all the
minor things at home (CHA/nurse in Moyamba).
Moreover, salaries are paid into bank accounts located in district
towns. HWs with these accounts were likely to be subject to the im-
mediate financial demands of family members living there. In some
cases, financial pressures exerted on the salary were unavoidable
due to the family’s knowledge (or rumors) of its amount. One HW
recounted:
When the free health care came in action, we were told that our
salary scale will be close to 1 million. This is creating a big prob-
lem in our marital home. Like. . . our husbands, some are not
educated, some did not go to school, so hearing this rumor, they
said it’s true. Then sometime in May-June, something was added
to our salary, so that month we got 1 million, and that rumor
went around. People were saying that our salary is now. that this
is what we are earning. So then when we received our normal sal-
ary [about 500,000 Le.], when I got home I told my husband,
‘here is the salary’, and he said, ‘this is a big lie’. So I told him,
‘let’s go to the bank, there you will find out if it is true or a
lie’(Female MCH Aide in Kenema).
In contrast, revenues from per diems, activities outside of the health
sector and in-kind gifts were used for the personal subsistence and
to address ‘emergency’ issues. Moreover, irregular incomes of an un-
known amount (such as per diems and PBF) have the advantage of
being more easily ‘hidden’ from family pressures, and revenues paid
in cash (i.e. per diems) are readily available to HWs and appear es-
sential for the subsistence of those in rural posts and those not
receiving a salary:
[interviewer] What do you mean, this [per diems] is the only
money you have? You have your salary as well. No. I mean, for
here. Because our salary is paid in our account. For here, we
don’t have any other way to have money’ (MCH Aide in rural
Moyamba).
[I use per diems because] I need things here. We don’t have ac-
cess to bank so we find things difficult (CHA/nurse in rural
Moyamba).
Sometimes DSA is useful because it is no easy to get money here,
because I am not on payroll. It is useful, it helps me (MCH Aide
in rural Bo)
Some HWs recounted using per diems specifically for themselves, in
contrast to other incomes that can be shared with the family. They
said that with per diems ‘I can buy something for myself’ (MCH
Aide in Kenema) or ‘I buy anything I want’ (MCH Aide in Kenema).
Income from activities outside of the health sector had also an
important function as it could provide flexible financial resources
which worked as a mechanism to smooth income and deal with the
irregularity of other revenues. Similarly to per diems, income from
non-health activities was also reported to provide a personal, less
visible allowance. Some mentioned:
I can use this if I run short of money (MCH Aide in Moyamba)
I have to do some little business, because if there are problems I
can solve my problems quietly (MCH Aide in Kenema—em-
phasis added).
In turn, however, the possibility of carrying out business-related
non-health activities depended on having substantial amount of un-
spent money from other sources to be re-invested. PBF, which can
represent a considerable amount paid at once, was seen as useful in
this sense. The emerging hypothesis that non-health income oppor-
tunities are more likely to be available for those with higher incomes
on PBF was tested using survey data, by regressing the amounts
earned from non-health activities on PBF amounts, controlling for
variables at individual and facility level. We found a positive and
significant coefficient (P¼0.05), which confirmed the hypothesis.
Discussion
This study set out to explore the remunerations of public primary
HWs in three districts of Sierra Leone and to investigate the individ-
ual and facility determinants of the income levels, and the implica-
tions that income fragmentation has for HWs. The results confirm
that the remuneration of HWs is made up of different sources, be-
yond the salary and incomes related to their official job. We found
that governmental payments (which include primarily salary and
PBF, as the remote allowance had been discontinued in 2012) repre-
sent the main share of HWs monthly income. This result is similar
to findings in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria (McCoy et al. 2008;
Akwataghibe et al. 2013). The high share of government pay reflects
the efforts towards harmonization and alignment of remuneration
undertaken by external actors (donors and NGOs) in Sierra Leone
around the launch of the FHCI. In particular, top-ups are found to
represent a very limited additional revenue (only one NGO in Bo
was still providing them at the time of the research). The harmoniza-
tion of incentives in Sierra Leone stands in contrast to the experience
of other countries where the introduction of fee exemptions did not
entail major reforms to ensure incentive alignment (Witter et al.
2016). On the other hand, the share of other incomes remain im-
portant for HWs. In particular, per diems account for an essential
part of their income (15–21%), and non-health activities seem quite
relevant for some workers, with 21% who declare engaging in them.
This compares with 42% of HWs practicing non-medical businesses
in Nigeria (Akwataghibe et al. 2013). In contrast with some of the
literature (Ferrinho et al. 2004a; Akwataghibe et al. 2013; McPake
et al. 2014), revenues from health-related private practice are found
to be limited. Although this could reflect underreporting, the finding
is likely to be explained by the fact that our sample includes lower
cadres of HWs, such as nursing aides, rather than doctors (the focus
of much literature on dual practice), posted in rural areas. In those
settings, HWs often live and work in the same building and do not
have the possibility of practicing in a separate facility. Potential
earnings from outreach or home visits would have been accounted
under ‘gifts and payments from patients’. Also, studies exploring
health seeking behavior in Sierra Leone stress that the alternative to
treatment in public facilities are traditional healers or drug peddlers,
rather than the private healthcare sector, which is underdeveloped
outside the capital (Scott et al. 2014).
Our results also show that in the three study districts there exist
differences between HWs which are explained by individual and
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facility characteristics, as well as differences across districts. In par-
ticular, we found that CHOs are more likely to sell drugs, possibly
given their position within the facility which allows better control of
drug stocks (Ferrinho et al. 2004b). HWs (re)trained after 2010 did
not receive the correct salary for their qualification and younger
ones were less likely to receive a salary, revealing the problems in
the Ministry payroll. In terms of rural-urban posting, we did not
find significant differences in the HWs overall income, despite some
literature suggesting that HWs prefer urban posts as they can earn
additional income in monetized urban economies (Witter et al.
2011). In fact, our findings show that per diems and gifts from pa-
tients were higher for those in rural areas, and there were no differ-
ences in earnings from non-health activities, which were often
linked to agriculture and not viable in towns. However, in the inter-
views HWs stressed their preference for business-related activities
where possible. Again, the absence of a rural–urban divide in in-
comes may be related to the sample which includes lower cadres in
mostly rural areas or smaller towns. A preference for posting in
urban areas remained in the narrative of the HWs, and it is likely to
be linked to factors such as transport and communication issues
(and related costs), working conditions, housing, social relations,
etc. While our results show no unfair economic advantage for HWs
in rural posts, they highlight the absence of specific incentives to
compensate the difficulties of those posts, which had in theory been
introduced with the remote allowance (then discontinued). Finally,
there were important income differences based on the district of
posting, which seems related to the presence of NGOs in the districts
(Bertone and Witter 2015b). All these differences are not in line
with the HRH strategies established at central level, and may have
potential negative effects on recruitment, distribution and motiv-
ation of HWs.
Qualitative interviews showed that features of payments, such as
regularity, reliability, ease of access, etc., are critical to define how
HWs perceive and value each income. It emerged that HWs do not
see incomes as perfect substitutes or fungible. Depending on their
features, revenues will be used differently. This echoes the literature
on ‘mental accounting’, which looks at the practice of assigning fi-
nancial activities to specific accounts, by labelling sources and uses
of funds and grouping them in categories constrained by mental
budgets (Thaler 1999). The main consequence of this practice is that
income in one category can be differently perceived from income in
another (for example, regular income is considered different from a
one-off windfall) and the assumption of fungibility of income be-
comes open for debate, with potential consequences on how we
think about individuals’ and households’ financial decision-making.
The existence of mental accounting has been confirmed in low-in-
come settings (Duflo and Udry 2003; Davies et al. 2009; Villa et al.
2011). We also identified practices to deal with financial pressures
from the extended family. These are in line with rich ethnographic
work on moral and affective economy in Africa (Hyden 2006) and
economics research exploring the effects of kin on financial choices
(Hoff and Sen 2005; La Ferrara 2007). In particular, the practice of
‘income hiding’ to avoid predatory demands from family members
has been documented in sub-Saharan settings, with qualitative and
experimental methods (Baland et al. 2011; Jakiela and Ozier 2012;
Beekman et al. 2015).
Our study has some limitations. Results are not representative of
the entire country, although they cover 57% of all primary care facili-
ties in three of fourteen districts, and our sample may slightly over-
represent in-charges compared to staff HWs. Moreover, HWs in-
comes were estimated using methods and data sources with varying
levels of reliability. Despite the longitudinal logbook method and the
thorough enumerators’ training adopted to limit response bias, it is
possible that certain revenues, and in particular the most sensitive
ones, such as those derived from user fees, illicit sale of drugs or
under-the-table payments, were underreported for fear of conse-
quences (in the case of illegal activities) and because of the negative
perceptions of the public around user fees even for non-exempted ser-
vices (Denney and Mallett 2014). However, although those amounts
are likely to be lower-end estimates, they are still far from negligible
for many respondents, and we are able to derive valuable information
about their existence within the remunerations of HWs.
Together, our findings have important policy implications for
how we go about (re)thinking the design of financial incentive strat-
egies. While salary in Sierra Leone represents more than half of the
HWs monthly revenues and remains their main income, the rest of
the remuneration is made up of sources for which there is no routine
information available and which often escape central-level actors
during the decision-making processes on financial incentive pack-
ages. As a consequence, these incomes can be subject to erroneous
perceptions. For example, despite the widespread views of actors at
central level of the relevance and distorting effects of salary supple-
mentations, our research reveals that this practice had been almost
completely discontinued for primary HWs in the study districts at
the time of the research. Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in
collecting reliable routine data on all incomes, looking at salaries,
even in conjunction with other official allowances and bonuses may
not be enough to understand what financial incentives HWs face,
and how attractive or not some posts may be. A better knowledge of
the income structure and income opportunities for HWs is essential
to set rules and establish the right incentive environment to address
retention, distribution and motivation issues. In particular, there
seems to be room for coordination with donors and NGOs to align
remunerations from top-ups (as effectively done in the study dis-
tricts), as well as per diems (which remain problematic) and reduce
unfair differences among HWs deriving from those payments.
Importantly, it emerged from our study that HWs use different
incomes in different ways to such extent that incomes are not fully
fungible and the marginal effect of increasing one income source
will not necessarily be equivalent to the marginal effect of increasing
another source. How HWs value their revenue, in relation with one
another and within the broader incentive environment, should be
carefully considered. For example, salary increments could have lit-
tle effect if appropriated by the extended family. On the other hand,
while per diems have perverse effects (Vian et al. 2013) that must
undoubtedly be addressed, they could play a particular role as a sal-
ary complement that is easily accessible and can be sheltered from
family pressures. Similarly, activities outside of the health sector
may have negative effects as they increase absenteeism (Van
Lerberghe et al. 2002), but their revenues have an important role to
deal with income instability.
This study reflects the situation as it was in Sierra Leone before
the ongoing EVD outbreak. While at the time of the research most
of the top-ups from external organizations had been eliminated,
with the outbreak new payments have been introduced. A substan-
tial hazard pay of 196–495 USD/month has been added to the remu-
neration of HWs involved in the EVD response (NERC 2015) and
NGOs and donors are reportedly paying a variety of financial incen-
tives in the specific sites where they operate. These allowances are
poorly mastered at central level and their impact on the motivation
of workers is undocumented. Additionally, they raise questions
about the effects of their discontinuation, especially given their con-
siderable amount. The post-EVD reconstruction phase will undoubt-
edly require new approaches to health system strengthening, taking
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into account the role of incentives for HWs. This study can provide
useful lessons in this sense. It stresses the importance of rationaliza-
tion and alignment of incentives under the MoH lead, as well as the
need for an increased consideration of the underlying potential to
motivate HWs via financial and non-financial features of payments.
Conclusions
This paper highlights a series of important and understudied issues
about the remuneration of HWs, which are likely to have a pro-
found impact on retention and motivation and are of key policy rele-
vance. In particular, it stresses the importance of understanding (and
the potential for harmonization of) financial incentives beyond those
usually known and analyzed at central level, in order to reduce un-
justifiable income differences between HWs, which could have nega-
tive effects on their distribution, motivation and performance.
Additionally, we provide evidence that incomes are not fungible in
the views of HWs, so that the same increase in different income
components may not have the same effects. Reflecting on the fea-
tures and uses of incomes from a micro-level perspective is necessary
to better understand how changes in incomes’ level affect HWs.
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